United Nations S/2016/610

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith a note that refutes the content of the letter dated 17 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2016/457) and certain elements in the statements of the same Mission delivered during meetings of the Security Council held on 4 May and 8 June 2016 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

16-12029 (E) 150716

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Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Note on the allegations by the Russian Federation on procurement efforts by Daesh/ISIL

The allegations contained in the letter dated 17 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations (S/2016/457) are based on a selective use of elements in the report published in February 2016 by Conflict Armament Research on items Daesh is allegedly obtaining to produce improvised explosive devices.

First and foremost, the report by Conflict Armament Research cannot be considered as the result of a legitimate or reliable investigation for many reasons, including the fact that its sources include a terrorist organization such as the YPG/PYD.

Second, the report is not about Turkey alone, since it mentions the names of 51 companies from 20 countries, including the Russian Federation. Unsurprisingly, the Russian Federation, in its letter, intentionally and conveniently ignores this fact.

Third, even though it does mention Turkey as one of the source countries for these items, the report does not accuse Turkey or any country for this matter, since it is indicated that there is no evidence to suggest, nor that Conflict Armament Research in any respect implies, any direct transfer of material to Daesh by the countries and companies mentioned in the report.

The report clearly states that the items in question, all subject to legitimate commercial transactions, are subsequently diverted to other users. The proximity of Turkey to the conflict zone, as well as its large mining and agricultural sectors where such items are widely used, are stated as the main reasons for Turkey being one of the countries for the supply of these items.

The items for which Turkey is mentioned are paint material, commercial chemicals, copper wire and detonating cords which are used in mining and construction. These items are all used in various economic activities. Other items mentioned in the report from other sources include mobile phones, transistors and telecommunication cables. All of these items are subject to free trading, the only exception being detonating cords, of which Turkey does not allow the export to either Iraq or Syria due to the situation in these countries. This fact has also been confirmed by Turkish companies Conflict Armament Research has apparently directly contacted and is therefore reflected in the report. It is worth noting that Turkey has taken additional steps to address the risk of diversion of commercial chemicals and materials, such as ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate and detonating cord, including by prohibiting their export to Syria.

While most of the items listed in the letter from the Russian Federation could be procured through numerous sources, the same cannot be said of certain weapons used by Daesh in targeting Turkish towns bordering Syria. It is crucial that the source of these weapons and materiel be investigated.

As can be easily inferred by the above, the Russian Federation has once again attempted to divert attention from the negative implications of its operations in Syria, which it uses to advance its political agenda in the region, under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

Moreover, the Russian Federation often attempts to benefit from the public meetings of the Security Council, which non-members of the Council cannot attend, to voice its allegations against Turkey, the latest of such conduct having occurred on 4 May and 8 June 2016. We refute claims voiced by the Russian Federation during those meetings in their entirety.

United Nations S/2016/611

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 12 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the following information.

I have sent you repeated letters regarding the Turkish regime's ongoing violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, actions that flagrantly contravene of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council. In that context, I wish to inform you of the following facts:

The Turkish authorities have continued to dig trenches within Syrian territory. They have continued to build a wall stretching from the village of Mulla Khalil to the village of Damah in the Afrin district of Aleppo governorate. They have also cut down olive trees and begun digging trenches and building a wall near the village of Mutlaq in the Afrin district of Aleppo governorate, on Syrian territory. They have built another wall in the Jisr al-Shughur countryside, in Idlib governorate, from the village of Zi'aybaqi northwards towards the Duwaysat dam, on Syrian territory.

Not content with those actions, the Turkish regime has encouraged the so-called Sultan Murad Brigade, one of the armed terrorist groups on Syrian territory that it supports and funds, to dig a tunnel from the Turkish border to the village of Akdah in I'zaz district, in the Aleppo countryside, with a view to smuggling weapons, ammunition and terrorists.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to assume its responsibility and take a firm and prompt approach when responding to the actions of the Turkish regime, which has once again made plain its disregard for the Charter of the United Nations and ignored all of the relevant international instruments, laws and Security Council resolutions. Any delay or hesitation in the Security Council's response to the destructive actions of the Turkish regime would endanger peace and security not only in the region but around the world.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-12138 (E) 150716 180716

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United Nations S/2016/612

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 13 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2016/572) for the period from 26 February to 24 June 2016.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its firm commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic also reiterates the position set forth in numerous letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council regarding implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It is surprised that the Secretariat persists in mentioning the Syrian Arab Republic in its reports on the implementation of that resolution, which was adopted as a result of Israel's military aggression against Lebanon in 2006. Accordingly, reports of the Secretariat should conform to the mandate set out in the resolution, instead of deviating from its primary objective.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic rejects Israel's baseless claims concerning the transfer of weapons to Lebanon. Those claims are a desperate attempt to distract attention from the real threat, namely Israel's own aggressive policies, which endanger stability in the region as a whole. It is surprising that the Secretariat persists in including such malicious allegations in its reports, although it acknowledges that it is not in a position to verify them.

The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that the delineation of the border between Syria and Lebanon is an issue of bilateral sovereignty that should be decided by those States when the conditions on the ground permit. The delineation of borders in the Shab'a Farms area should take place after the Israeli occupation of that area has come to an end in accordance with the authoritative international resolutions.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the Syrian Arab Army has continued to defend all Syrian territory and respond to armed terrorist groups, which are supported and funded by States and actors that are now well known. It is surprising that the Secretariat is overlooking the fact that Lebanese political movements are openly seeking to destabilize Syria by sponsoring, protecting and supporting the *takfirist* terrorist groups that are active in many parts of Lebanon. Those movements are also providing the terrorists with political and

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logistical support, and that has enabled them to turn those areas into a rear base for terrorist groups that are active in numerous areas next to the Lebanese border.

The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that it is important for the reports of the Secretariat to avoid double standards with regard to counter-terrorism and the threat that terrorism represents to Syria. Events in Lebanon, Iraq and other countries have proven that terrorism is not confined to a particular State, but that the threat extends to the countries of the entire region and beyond.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic remains committed to cooperating with Lebanon in order to ensure respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the two kindred countries, and thereby foster the security and stability of both countries and prevent the use of either country's territory to undermine the national security and stability of the other.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/613

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2016

Original: English

Identical letters dated 13 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 July 2016 addressed to you by the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, drawing attention to the alarming human rights situation and the grave developments that are currently taking place in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (see annex).

We would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council, in connection with the item entitled "The India-Pakistan question".

(*Signed*) Maleeha **Lodhi**

16-12060 (E) 150716

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Annex to the identical letters dated 13 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to bring to your urgent attention the grave developments that are currently taking place in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

You would be aware of the alarming human rights situation in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir following the extrajudicial execution of 22-year-old Kashmiri youth leader and rights activist, Burhan Muzaffar Wani, by Indian security officers in the southern town of Pulwama in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir on 8 July 2016.

In the exercise of their fundamental human rights, tens of thousands of Kashmiris came out to peacefully protest against this killing and to pay homage to this young symbol of the Kashmiri movement for self-determination. Brute force, including indiscriminate use of live ammunition by Indian security forces on peaceful protestors, has resulted in more than 30 casualties and injuries to over 300 innocent people over the past three days.

The valiant people of Jammu and Kashmir have thus been subjected to yet another brutal bloodbath at the hands of the Indian occupying forces that continue to operate with complete impunity, trampling the fundamental freedoms of the Kashmiri people in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. I am sure that in these times of democracy and accountability, the international community, led by the United Nations, cannot remain passive to such callous behaviour and grave violations of human rights by India in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir over the last several decades.

The United Nations has a special and permanent responsibility with regard to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which remains on the agenda of the Security Council and is yet to be resolved in accordance with its relevant resolutions. The current situation in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir is in fact the result of the continued denial by India of the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people through a free and fair plebiscite under United Nations auspices, which was assured by the United Nations in its multiple resolutions.

You would agree that the non-resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is a constant source of tension and instability in the region and a threat to international peace and security. Lack of progress in finding a durable solution to the Kashmir question in accordance with United Nations resolutions, along with the continuing violations of human rights in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and lack of accountability therefor, have led to feelings of frustration and resentment, especially among the new generation of Kashmiris, who are increasingly adding their voices to the decades-long Kashmiri indigenous movement for self-determination. India can no longer be in denial of these facts by terming the situation an internal matter, a position that has no standing whatsoever, in view of the internationally recognized disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir, as is also reflected in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

I would like to urge you to take note of the prevailing situation in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and its serious implications for international peace and security. We also request that you call upon India to stop the killing of innocent civilians and to cease its repressive policies and human rights violations in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

Let me underline that, as a concerned party, Pakistan remains committed to peacefully resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Pakistan will continue to extend its moral and diplomatic support for the realization of the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has also always welcomed the role and initiatives of the Secretary-General to facilitate the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir question, and we will continue to support such efforts in the future.

(*Signed*) Sartaj Aziz
Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2016/614

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), adopted on 23 June 2016, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 1 August 2017.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have appointed the following experts:

Mr. Zobel Behalal, natural resources/finance (Cameroon)
Ms. Zaida Catalán, humanitarian issues (Chile)
Mr. Michael Sharp, armed groups (United States of America)
Mr. Roberto Sollazzo, natural resources/finance (Italy)
Mr. Christoph Vogel, armed groups (Germany)
Mr. David Zounmenou, arms (Benin)

I have also designated Mr. Sharp to serve as Coordinator of the Group of Experts.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-12137 (E) 150716

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United Nations A/70/985–S/2016/615

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 July 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda items 35 and 40

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia in June 2016 (see annex).* During the reported period, Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 635 times and continued the usage of large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from its positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and from its own territory.

As a result, one serviceman of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan was wounded.

The continuous occupation of a large part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the armed forces of Armenia remains the main obstacle in the settlement of the conflict and the only source of the escalation of the situation on the frontline and of occurrence of hostilities and casualties.

The sooner the Republic of Armenia withdraws its troops from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sooner peace and stability can be restored in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar Aliyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

16-12264 (E) 200716

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Annex to the letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for June 2016*

Dates (Weeks)	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Amount of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
1-8 June	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK/DShK/AKM	16	
	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK/AK/PK	10	
	Unnamed heights of Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	AK/PK/DShK/ AKM	19	
	Garagashly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	3	
	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Merzili village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	4	
	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	5	
	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK/SVD/PK	5	
	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK/AKM	12	
	Unnamed heights of Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	AK/PK/DShK	32	
	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	8	
	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	6	
	Gorgan village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	6	
	Horadiz village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	8	

Abbreviations: AGS, automatic grenade launcher, mounted; AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; MT, mine thrower; OSV, semi-automatic sniper rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG-7V, handheld anti-tank grenade launcher; SVD, sniper rifle; 60mm/82mm M, mortar; OSV-96, semi-automatic sniper rifle.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates (Weeks)	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Amount of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK/12.7mm M	20	
	Unnamed heights of Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	AK/12.7mm M	20	
	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	6	
	Unnamed heights of Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	AK	7	
	Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PKM/AK	1	
	Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Jafarli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights of Gedebey district, Azerbaijan	AK	4	
9-16 June	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM/12.7mm M/ DShK	21	
	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	7	
	Talysh and Yenikand villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Unnamed heights of Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	AK/AKM/PK	17	
	Merzili and Tazakend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	9	
	Merzili village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	2	
	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK/AKM	6	
	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	1	
	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK/AKM/PK	13	
	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	2	
	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	20	

Dates (Weeks)	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Amount of ceasefire violations	Casualties and damages
	Unnamed heights of Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	AK	13	
	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	14	
	Ashaghy Veysalli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	3	
	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	12	
	Gorgan village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	14	
	Horadiz village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	13	
	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	11	
	Unnamed heights of Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	AK	17	
	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	3	
	Unnamed heights of Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	AK	8	
	Farahli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	1	
	Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Aghbulag village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK	5	
	Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	2	
	Alibayli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK/AKM	2	
	Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	1	
	Kohna Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK	5	
	Unnamed heights of Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	AK	5	
	Unnamed heights of Goygol district, Azerbaijan	AK	1	
	Unnamed heights of Gedebey district, Azerbaijan	AK	3	

Dates (Weeks)	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Amount of ceasefire violations	Casualties and damages
17-24 June	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	2	
	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	7	
	Talysh and Yenikand villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Unnamed heights of Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	AK/DShK/PK/ AKM	7	
	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Hasangaya village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	3	
	Seysulan and Gapanli villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	9	
	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	13	
	Unnamed heights of Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	AK/AKM	7	
	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	4	
	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	4	
	Gorgan village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Horadiz village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	6	
	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	8	
	Unnamed heights of Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	AK	4	
	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Unnamed heights of Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	AK	4	

Dates (Weeks)	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Amount of ceasefire violations	Casualties and damages
	Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PKM/AK	3	
	Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK/DShK	2	
	Aghbulag village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	3	
	Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM/AK	11	
	Alibayli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK/AKM	3	
	Muncuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Kohna Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK	4	
	Unnamed heights of Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	AK	1	
25-30 June	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	4	
	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM/AK	3	
	Unnamed heights of Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	AK/AKM/DShK	3	
	Merzili village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK	1	
	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK	3	
	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK/AKM/ OSV 96	4	
	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	3	
	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK/AKM	11	1 serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
	Unnamed heights of Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	AK	2	
	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	7	
	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	1	
	Gorgan village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	4	
	Horadiz village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	5	

Dates (Weeks)	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Amount of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	5	
	Unnamed heights of Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	AK	2	
	Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	2	
	Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PK/AK	4	
	Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	2	
	Kohna Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK/PK	2	
	Unnamed heights of Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	AKM/AK	3	

United Nations S/2016/616

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I write further to my previous letters informing you of acts of aggression carried out by the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, its oil and gas facilities and its economic infrastructure. I wish to inform you that the coalition has once again deliberately attacked the service infrastructure by bombarding the following facilities:

- The Malih station in the Tanak oil field, in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, on 29 February 2016;
- The Dayr al-Zawr gas plant, in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, on 8 March;
- The Dayr al-Zawr gas plant, in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, on 8 May;
- The main gas collection plant in the Umar oil field, in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, on 25 June.

The repeated bombardments have caused extensive material damage and have almost completely destroyed some of those facilities. The so-called international coalition's attacks have caused considerable damage to Syrian oil and gas facilities, particularly in the governorates of Dayr al-Zawr, Hasakah and Raqqah.

Not content with such attacks, coalition aircraft have endangered civil aviation by violating the G202 air corridor. On 12 May, two reconnaissance aircraft belonging to the so-called coalition cut off the air corridor between the first station and Tall Ruwayhad on two successive occasions, first from 1011 hours to 1512 hours at an altitude of 10 kilometres, and then from 1751 hours to 2114 hours at an altitude of 5 kilometres. Four drones also cut off the corridor on the same date, from 1414 hours to 2000 hours. The aircraft of the so-called coalition have also violated the Sawkan and Zalaf air corridors on a daily basis.

The so-called coalition air force bombardments of economic facilities and infrastructure, along with the unilateral coercive economic measures which certain States have imposed on the Syrian people, have exacerbated the difficult situation in which the country finds itself. In view of those repeated and deliberate attacks on its oil facilities and its economy, the Syrian Arab Republic reserves the right to demand that the States participating in the American coalition pay compensation to Syria for

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the damage caused. Such compensation is a right enshrined in international law. The Syrian Arab Republic calls on those States to bring an immediate end to such practices, which are destroying the resources of the Syrian people, prolonging the crisis and delaying recovery. It also calls for an immediate end to all practices that endanger the safety of civil aviation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/617

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 6 July 2016 from the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union Commission, Smaïl Chergui, on behalf of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (see annex), forwarding the communiqué on the situation in Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 608th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 29 June 2016.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-12149 (E) 180716

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Annex

6 July 2016

On behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, I would like to forward the communiqué on the situation in Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) adopted at the 608th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 29 June 2016 (see enclosure).

On the basis of the recommendations of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia and the revised concept of operations of AMISOM, the Peace and Security Council acknowledged the sustained progress made by AMISOM. It further welcomed the appointment of a new AMISOM Force Commander and expressed full support for his leadership in enhancing the Mission's operational effectiveness and strengthening its command and control.

In transmitting the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council, I would like to reiterate the commitment of the African Union to work closely with the United Nations and other international stakeholders towards bringing about durable peace, security and stability in Somalia.

The African Union looks forward to United Nations support for the implementation of this communique, and it would be appreciated if the document could be circulated as an official document of the United Nations Security Council.

(*Signed*) Smaïl **Chergui**
Ambassador
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security

Enclosure

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 608th meeting, held on 29 June 2016, adopted the following decision on the situation in Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):

The Council,

1. **Takes note** of the briefing provided by the acting Director for Peace and Security on behalf of the Commissioner for Peace and Security on the situation in Somalia. The Council also takes note of the statements made by the representatives of Somalia, Ethiopia, in its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the European Union and the United Nations;

2. **Condemns in the strongest possible terms** the continuing attacks carried out by the Al Shaabab terrorist group, including the recent attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel, in the busy KM-4 junction in southern Mogadishu, which resulted in at least 15 deaths, including that of Buri Mohamed Hamza, Somalia's State Minister for Environment, and left several civilians injured. The Council expresses its deepest condolences and solidarity with the people of Somalia, especially the families affected in the recent and other attacks by the terrorist group. The Council also expresses its deep concern over the continued threat that Al Shabaab poses to peace and stability in Somalia and the region;

3. **Welcomes** the progress made by the Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of AMISOM, in the establishment of permanent democratic institutions through inclusive political processes, including the progress made in State formation, constitution-making and electoral processes. In this respect, the Council urges the Federal Government of Somalia to remain committed and more deliberate in its efforts to achieve its political milestones, as reflected in Vision 2016, especially in the successful conduct of elections scheduled for August/September 2016;

4. **Stresses** the need to adhere to this electoral timeline and to ensure a transparent, inclusive and credible electoral process, as well as the need for a common understanding and resolution of the current challenges associated with the State formation process. The Council also calls for the cooperation of all the people of Somalia, particularly those in Hiraan and Middle Shabele, in order to enable the State formation process to move forward. The Council urges the people of Somalia to assume greater responsibility for the security and governance of their country;

5. **Emphasizes** the need to align the current political developments in Somalia with efforts to develop capable, inclusive and effective Somalia National Security Forces, in line with the security strategy outlined in the revised concept of operations. Accordingly, the Council reiterates the need for the international community to promote greater coordination and cooperation through the African Union in the collective efforts to achieve a more deliberate and effective approach in building the capacity of the Somalia National Security Forces. In this regard, the Council urges the United Nations Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on Somalia, as contained in Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), as a critical aspect of building capable Somalian security institutions;

6. **Commends** the efforts of the AU Commission for having convened the workshop that revised the AMISOM concept of operations, in line with the communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.2(DXCV)) of its 595th meeting, held on 28 April 2015. In this respect, the Council takes note of the meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee, which was held in Kampala on 22 June 2016, that deliberated and endorsed the main recommendations of the revised concept of operations;

7. **Expresses satisfaction** with the outcome of the revised concept of operations in relation to the identified priority tasks, namely: the support and contribution of AMISOM to securing the electoral process in Somalia in coordination with the Elections Security Taskforce within the Mission area; more targeted and effective offensive operations by AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces against Al Shaabab; implementation of the established Joint Technical Intelligence Committees in order to improve intelligence-sharing and management; and enhanced command and control by urgently filling structures of the strategic, operational and tactical headquarters of AMISOM with dedicated and qualified personnel;

8. **Welcomes** the appointment of General Osman Nour Soubagleh by the Chairperson of the AU Commission as the new AMISOM Force Commander on 31 May 2016, and his participation in the revision of the concept of operations, as well as in the meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee. The Council further expresses satisfaction with this appointment as part of efforts to enhance AMISOM offensive operations and to promote increased command and control in the conduct of AMISOM operations, in line with the decision of the Djibouti Summit and other relevant decisions. The Council expresses full support to the new Force Commander and calls upon him to spare no effort in promoting greater efficiency and coordination of AMISOM operations;

9. **Endorses** the revised concept of operations, which reflects efforts towards enhancing the operations of AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces and crucially identifies indicative timelines for an exit strategy of AMISOM from Somalia. Accordingly, the Council requests the AU Commission to formally transmit the endorsed concept of operations to the troop- and police-contributing countries and the United Nations Security Council for their consideration. The Council further directs the Commission and AMISOM, and requests the United Nations and relevant stakeholders, to work in close collaboration to ensure effective implementation of the revised concept of operations;

10. **Takes note** of the indicative timelines of the AMISOM exit strategy presented by the AU Commission, which prioritizes territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces until October 2018 and a subsequent drawdown and transfer of security responsibilities to the Somalia National Security Forces from 2018 to December 2020. The Council further urges all troop- and police-contributing countries to work in a collective, concerted and coordinated manner within the indicative time frame;

11. **Expresses appreciation** to the United Nations for its support to AMISOM, and stresses the need for continued efforts to enhance that support through the utilization of the United Nations assessed contribution, bearing in mind that, in deploying a mission in Somalia, the African Union is acting on behalf of the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the

maintenance of international peace and security, and aims at creating conditions conducive to the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia;

12. **Reiterates its call** for the deployment of additional force enablers, especially the pledged air assets by Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. In this regard, the Council notes with concern the prolonged negotiations between the United Nations and troop- and police-contributing countries in the finalization of the letters of assist that will facilitate the deployment of these air assets. Accordingly, the Council reiterates its call for the urgent finalization of the negotiations on the letters of assist, without further delay, taking into account that reimbursement rates for these assets should be commensurate with the context of AMISOM asymmetrical operations;

13. **Renews** the appreciation of the African Union to the European Union and its member States for their support to AMISOM as well as other contributions made towards the overall peace, security and stability of Somalia. The Council welcomes the continued support of the European Union to AMISOM under the Africa Peace Facility, based on the strategic partnership between Africa and the European Union and in the mutual interest of both continents, to ensure peace and security in Somalia. In this respect, the Council takes note of the European Union's decision to accelerate the payment of the AMISOM troop allowance through a lump-sum approach, and looks forward to the timely implementation of this disbursement model within the shortest time frame. The Council also calls for the fulfilment of the pledge of funds for Somalia, especially in this critical period of elections in the country;

14. **Further expresses deep concern** about the recent decision by the European Union to alter the payment procedures for the Burundian National Defence Force contingent within AMISOM, bearing in mind the critical phase of AMISOM operations, especially in the light of the upcoming elections in Somalia. Accordingly, the Council urges the European Union to reverse or at least delay the implementation of this decision in order to avoid possible adverse effects that could undermine the operational momentum of AMISOM;

15. **Pays tribute** to all AMISOM uniformed and civilian personnel as well as the troop- and police-contributing countries, namely, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, for their continued commitment and the sacrifices made thus far;

16. **Requests** the AU Commission to report back to the Council on the implementation of the revised concept of operations not later than 90 days from the date of the adoption of this communiqué;

17. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2016/618

Security Council

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18 July 2016

Original: English

Note verbale dated 13 July 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council for the month of July 2016, and attaches herewith the official response, dated 13 July 2016, of the Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity to the communiqué of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (see annex).

We would appreciate it if the response of the Transitional Government of National Unity could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 13 July 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Response dated 13 July 2016 of the Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity to the communiqué of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

1. The Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity held an extraordinary meeting, No. 02/2016, on 12 July 2016 and listened inter alia to a briefing from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on the communiqué of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) during its fifty-sixth extraordinary session on South Sudan, held on 11 July 2016 in Nairobi. The Council resolved to respond to the IGAD communiqué.

2. The Council further acknowledges the IGAD communiqué and expresses its sincere gratitude for its continuous concern about the political and security situation in the Republic of South Sudan. Furthermore, it expresses its unreserved commitment to cooperate with the leadership of IGAD to stabilize the situation in the context of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS).

3. The fighting began on 7 July 2016, at the Lou Clinic security checkpoint. On 8 July 2016, it fully erupted in the Presidential Palace, followed by the 10 July 2016 fighting where the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-I0) attacked a government force checkpoint and overran it. On 11 July 2016, government forces moved to recapture that post from SPLA-IO. The Lieutenant Colonel who shot security soldiers at the Lou checkpoint is the same officer who provoked the fight again in the Presidential Palace. The enclosure to the present annex provides a brief description of the events for fair judgment of the parties to the conflict.

4. Having highlighted the events related to the fight in Juba, in paragraph 3 above, the Council of Ministers:

(a) Believes that the IGAD Council of Ministers must now have a concrete appreciation of what actually happened;

(b) Maintains that the government forces did not target any United Nations compound, nor did they attempt to prevent civilians from getting protection. To the contrary, United Nations forces targeted Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers advancing to the recapture their post from SPLA-IO and destroyed two T-72 tanks and killed several SPLA soldiers;

(c) The President showed undoubted control over the Presidential Guards and demonstrated responsibility for the safety of his colleagues, the First Vice President, the Vice President and other ministers, otherwise South Sudan would have been plunged into severe insecurity and a high potential for total return to war.

In addition to the point made above (para. 4 (c)), the President exercises full command and control over the SPLA forces as affirmed by the truce so far observed in Juba in response to Presidential Order No. 17/2016, issued 11 July 2016.

Juba is now calm, civilians are returning home, the army is withdrawing to their respective barracks, security checkpoints have been reduced to only essential areas and messages of calm and reconciliation are being issued to the public from the Office of the President and through the Council of Ministers.

5. With regards to the demands outlined in the IGAD Council of Ministers Communiqué, the Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity makes the following response:

(a) **On the ceasefire**: The Council confirms that the President issued an Order, as referred to earlier (No. 17/2016, issued 11 July 2016), declaring a cessation of hostilities between SPLA and SPLA-IO effective instantly from 6 p.m. with unequivocal orders to all SPLA Commanders.

The President sent additional messages to all Commanders reiterating the return of all SPLA soldiers to their respective barracks and calling on the forces to protect civilians and their property, protect any ethnic groups as well as any SPLA-IO who surrender to SPLA and limit security checkpoints to only essential and important government installations and institutions.

(b) **On Juba International Airport**: The Council of Ministers affirms that Juba International Airport was never closed to be reopened. It admits the Airport witnessed a temporary interruption for outgoing and incoming flights. However, since the issuance of the presidential order for cessation of hostilities, Juba International Airport commenced operations effectively from 12 July 2016 and continues to operate peacefully and unabated.

The normal functioning of the Airport has not been compromised. Hence the concern expressed in the IGAD communiqué regarding protection of the Airport is not justified.

(c) **On the immediate return of all forces and weapons to barracks**: The Council confirms with delight that this concern has been addressed as explained in paragraph 5 (a) above.

(d) **On opening humanitarian corridors**: Open delivery of humanitarian assistance and secure delivery corridors have always been a high priority policy of the government since the eruption of the conflict on 15 December 2013.

It remains a cornerstone policy of the Transitional Government of National Unity, which has been reinforced by Presidential Orders to all the Governors of the States of South Sudan and SPLA Commanders to remove illegal roadblocks and allow unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need all over the country.

The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, in collaboration with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, has developed a plan of action to implementation of chapter III of ARCSS on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. This plan is now the subject of discussion between the Ministry, the Commission, United Nations humanitarian agencies and others to agree on the articulated strategic direction and plan of action on the subject.

(e) **On the revision of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)**: The Council recalls that the mandate of UNMISS was reviewed in November 2015 and that UNMISS currently has a force of over 12,000 troops.

As outlined earlier, fighting has come to an end and the security situation is returning to normalcy. Therefore, the Council sees no justification and strongly believes that the establishment of an Intervention Brigade is totally unwarranted and will actually complicate the situation and increase insecurity,

As for the demand of the IGAD Council of Ministers to increase troops to, inter alia, secure Juba, this is provided for in chapter II, article 5 of ARCSS. With the current improvement in the security situation in Juba, the Council again sees no reason for this demand.

(f) **On accountability of those responsible for the breakdown of law and order**: The President of the Republic issued a Republican Order (No. 16/2016, effective 8 July 2016) for the formation of an Investigation Committee to investigate the incidents, which started with the fight on 7 July 2016.

The Minister of Interior is the Chairperson, assisted by the Minister of National Security as Secretary, and with the membership of five senior officers from both sides. The same Committee will equally investigate the incident of 8 July 2016. The committee is given the option to co-opt any relevant member or members. The Transitional Government of National Unity awaits the report of the Committee and its recommendations.

(g) **On the implementation of the security arrangements as enshrined in ARCSS**: The Council had hoped that former President Festus Mogae, Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, would brief the IGAD Council of Ministers on the progress already made on the implementation of the security arrangements.

However, the Council confirms that since the commencement of the implementation of the Agreement, many parts of chapter I, on the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, have been undertaken. These include the formation of: (i) the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC); (ii) the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM); (iii) the Strategic Defense and Security Review Board; and (iv) the Joint Integrated Police.

In addition the Council made several resolutions on the release of prisoners of war and detainees, cantonment areas in Greater Upper Nile and Greater Equatoria, the verification of cantonment areas in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and directives given to JMCC and CTSAMM to immediately implement those resolutions.

In conclusion

(a) The Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity reiterates its appreciation of the concerns raised by the IGAD Council of Ministers and underlines its commitment to cooperate with IGAD and the entire international community to ensure security in Juba specifically and South Sudan in general.

(b) The Council regrets the unfortunate fighting that erupted on 7 July 2016, nearly three months after the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity, assures IGAD that the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan is the only valuable instrument for peace in South Sudan and calls on IGAD to continue providing support.

(*Signed*) Martin Elia **Lomuro**
Minister of Cabinet Affairs

Enclosure

Statement of facts on the fighting that erupted in the Republic of South Sudan on 7, 8, 10 and 11 July 2016, respectively

6. The Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity wishes to make a brief statement of facts regarding the unfortunate fighting that erupted on 7 July and continued until 11 July 2016, as follows:

(a) On Thursday 7 July 2016, at approximately 7.45 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel David Rieu from the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) shot dead five people (two National Security, two Military Intelligence and a medical doctor passing by) conducting routine security checks at a checkpoint near Lou Clinic, a distance from the centre of Juba Town, in preparation for the fifth Independence Celebration day.

(b) The following day, on Friday, 8 July 2016, the President called on the First Vice President and the Vice President for a meeting in the Presidential Palace (J-1) to discuss how to de-escalate the situation.

(c) On 8 July 2016, it was observed that the First Vice President came to the meeting with a convoy of 20 Land Cruiser Picks, estimated to be carrying over 300 well-armed soldiers. The meeting, nevertheless, commenced and continued undisturbed to the point where the three leaders made credible resolution on the way forward, except for a few minor points that were to be ironed out the at 11 a.m. on Saturday, 9 July 2016.

(d) Before the three leaders could conclude their meeting in the President's meeting Hall, gunshots rained unabated at the Southern Gate to J-1. Despite all that happened, the President issued a Republic Order, No. 17/2016, for an immediate cessation of hostilities with immediate effect from the date of the signature, as from 6 p.m. GMT, 11 July 2016.

(e) The three leaders were taken by surprise and caught unaware as to the cause of the shooting that was taking place inside, outside and around the Palace. Indeed, they were paralysed and unable to control the situation until the Minister of National Security intervened.

(f) As the Presidential Guards gradually contained the assault, it finally transpired that Lieutenant Colonel David Rieu of SPLA-IO, who shot dead the five people on Thursday, 7 July 2016, had imposed himself to enter the Palace and, upon resistance by the Presidential Guards, shot dead First Lieutenant Kouch Kouch, and that ignited the fighting.

(g) As the President took control of the situation, the First Vice President revealed that the lieutenant colonel who ignited the fight was not among the officers who were to accompany him for the meeting.

(h) From there on, the President, throughout the hours of fighting:

(i) Personally protected the First Vice President and the Vice President in his office, and the three;

(ii) Called on his personal armoured vehicle to be brought from his residence, covered the First Vice President from reach by his own guards;

(iii) Opened the door for him and got him seated in the vehicle and then instructed the driver to take him safely up to the checkpoint at Lou Clinic so that he could walk to his residence under the protection of his own guards;

(iv) Before he was driven away, the President requested that he should call him to confirm that he had arrived safely. Indeed, the First Vice President called on arrival to his residence and thanked the President for the leadership he had shown to personally protect him during the unfortunate incident.

7. Prior to the evacuation of the First Vice President, the three leaders had agreed to meet on Saturday, 11 July 2016, at 11 a.m. to further discuss the aggravated situation, but since then the First Vice President is yet to confirm his intention to come for the meeting, although he has made contact with the President.

8. As we write this response, the President is patiently awaiting contact from his First Vice President in order to continue working with him and the other leaders of South Sudan to de-escalate the situation and focus in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan because it is the only sensible mechanism to return the country to political and security stability.

United Nations S/2016/619

Security Council

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15 July 2016

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

1. The President of the Security Council, building on the measures set out in the notes by the President of the Security Council contained in documents S/2016/170 of 22 February 2016, S/2014/393 of 5 June 2014, S/2012/937 of 17 December 2012 and S/2010/507 of 26 July 2010, and in an effort to further improve the effectiveness of and to ensure continuity in the work of the Council, wishes to state that all members of the Council are committed to implementing the measures set out below concerning newly elected members.

Preparation of newly elected members

2. The Security Council invites the newly elected members of the Council to observe all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary organs and the informal consultations of the whole for a period of three months, as from 1 October immediately preceding their term of membership. The Council also invites the Secretariat to provide all relevant communications of the Council to the newly elected members during the above-mentioned period.

3. Notwithstanding the foregoing measure, the Security Council will not invite the newly elected members to a specific private meeting of the Council or to specific informal consultations of the whole if a request to that effect is made by a member of the Council where exceptional circumstances exist. The newly elected members will not be invited to the meetings of the Council or the informal consultations of the whole related to the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General. The newly elected members may be invited to the monthly luncheon with the Secretary-General held in December immediately preceding their term of membership, at the discretion of the President of the Council for that month.

4. The Security Council invites the Secretariat to continue to take appropriate measures to familiarize the newly elected members with the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs, including by providing briefing materials and holding seminars before they begin to attend Council meetings.

Selection of Chairs of subsidiary organs

5. The members of the Security Council should make every effort to agree provisionally on the appointment of the Chairs of the subsidiary organs for the following year no later than 1 October.

6. To that end, the members of the Security Council will start an informal process of consultations, with the participation of all Council members, on the appointment

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of the Chairs of the subsidiary organs from among the members of the Council for the following year as soon as possible after each election of members of the Council. The members of the Council should also consult informally with the newly elected members in the process.

7. This informal process of consultations will be undertaken in a balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way so as to facilitate an exchange of information related to the work of the subsidiary organs involved and will be facilitated jointly by two members of the Security Council working in full cooperation.

8. All members and newly elected members of the Security Council should be informed of the outcome of the informal process of consultations on the appointment of the Chairs of the subsidiary organs in a transparent and substantive way prior to the provisional agreement on the appointment.

Preparation of Chairs of subsidiary organs

9. The Chairs of the subsidiary organs are encouraged, with the assistance of the Secretariat as required, to provide those members of the Council that will take over the chairmanships with written and oral briefings about the work done during the outgoing chairmanship and to maintain informal meetings with the incoming Chairs, as necessary, including with the assistance of the Secretariat.

10. The briefings will be accompanied by documents adopted during the outgoing chairmanship and all informal documents and background information the outgoing Chair deems pertinent for enlightening the incoming Chair, including draft documents being discussed by the subsidiary organ. Taking into account that such documents and information might not have been made public, they will be provided to the members that will take over the chairmanships as soon as possible after the chairmanships have been provisionally decided.

11. The members of the Security Council acknowledge the support given to incoming Chairs by the Secretariat and request the Secretariat to consider further measures to provide incoming Chairs and their staffs with additional substantive and methodological briefings on the work of relevant subsidiary organs.